There are many similarities between the protests around Gezi Park in Turkey and those of the Free Pass Movement in Brazil.
In both cases, initial demonstrations were small with
specific objectives: to save the park and to obtain free public
transport, respectively. And discontent in both countries reached a
critical mass amid widespread perception that police used excessive
violence to disperse the protesters. It was at that moment, on two
continents, when tens of thousands of people mobilized in solidarity
with the initial dissenters — and not just in Istanbul and Sao Paulo, the cities where the confrontations initially took place.
Given the relative indifference or initial hostility on the
part of both public and private mainstream media, social networks are
the preferred medium for protestors, and they serve as an effective
space for coordination and decision-making. Of course, this preference
to inform and organize is also dirven by the social and demographic
profile of those involved. According to the polling institute Datafolha,
the average protester in Brazil is relatively young with a high level
of education, and the same is no doubt true in Turkey.
They also tend to be middle class, as measured by income
level, and this segment of society has a disproportionately high level
of Internet use. They are also more likely to belong to non-governmental
organizations or to participate in new social movements, as opposed to
having membership in more traditional, blue-collar organizations such as
trade unions.
The same was true in the cases of Iran in 2009 and Egypt
in 2011, but unlike them, Brazil and Turkey have democratically elected
governments. These are societies in which the middle class represents
the majority of the population. And that's the paradox. In a little over
a decade under the Workers’ Party government, 40 million people emerged
from poverty in Brazil. During the same time period under the
government of the Party for Justice and Development, GDP per capita
tripled in Turkey. And in both cases, a decade of relatively high growth
rates came to an end in 2012. The economy grew just 3% in Turkey last
year in contrast to 8.5% in 2011. In Brazil, growth last year was an
anemic and 0.9% after the previous year's 4.5% before President Dilma
Rousseff came to power.
When success breeds discontent
In both cases, the governments that contributed to the
emergence of a strong, middle class are the targets of protests by this
very population. Perhaps they fear for their economic and social
well-being, and don't want to risk a return to the poverty they left
behind after their countries' respective economic booms. History
suggests that few things are more volatile than a middle class faced
with the possibility of downward mobility.
Their decentralized nature, their disregard for traditional
hierarchies, and their unwillingness to settle or even ally with
political parties are often considered virtues of these new social movements.
But these factors can also dampen their political effectiveness, which
would be enhanced with organizational cooperation around shared
priorities and a more diverse socio-ecocomic representation. The latter,
in particular, is still missing in both Brazil and Turkey.
In terms of formulating shared priorities, when a correspondent for the Spanish newspaper El Pais
asked the protesters in Brazil about their primary reason for being
there, most hesitated before answering. And their ultimate responses
were far from uniform. As far as I know, nobody asked the same question
in Turkey, though in that case there seems to be an overwhelming and
unmistakable common grievance: the growing authoritarianism of Turkish
Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Erdogan’s government.
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